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Abstract 
 
Three cases of peacekeeping missions (MONUC, UNMIL 
and UNMIK) are analysed to show insights on the 
relation between civilian and military peacekeeping. 
After various changes in the UN system, most popular 
the Brahimi report, civilian approaches have become 
prominent. However, the implementation of civilian 
orientation in missions depends largely on the actual 
mandate and conduct of the mission. Personal 
engagement can lead to successful engagement, but 
the UN system shows various problems relating to 
coordination and equipment of a mission. 
Peacekeeping could be more successful if integrated 
civilian approaches would be applied. 
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1. Introduction 
The focus of UN peacekeeping missions has changed after the end of the Cold War.  Until 
1990 only few UN peacekeeping missions were conducted, mostly engaged in conflicts 
between states, but after the end of the Cold War the number of missions increased 
rapidly (MacQueen 2008:183). As noted by the United Nations, “the strategic context for 
UN peacekeeping dramatically changed”, encompassing various adaptations for 
peacekeepers like more complex tasks (UN 2010b). Conflicts had become miscellaneous. 
Former resistance movements became guerrilla groups and states that had been 
protected by their block became failed states1 without institutions and without monopole of 
power. Intra-state wars gained attention as they were no longer part of the game of the 
blocks, but serious threats for regional security and development. The international system 
was no longer the only reason for conflicts. Scholars recognised that realist IR theorists 
may have been wrong and the theoretical focus shifted to other actors than states and on 
perceptions and worldviews. This led also to adoptions within the UN system. 
With more peacekeeping missions and more diverse conflicts the discussion started in 
which direction UN peacekeeping missions evolve. Former Secretary General Kofi Annan 
elaborated a “human security” approach in 2005 which no longer included only the 
freedom from military threats, but also freedom from under nutrition and guarantee of basic 
human rights (Annan 2005). Furthermore, the Brahimi report (UN 2000:2) argued for a 
broader approach to UN peacekeeping with bigger and better equipped missions. Keeping 
the peace has shown to be insufficient for the solution of conflicts and therefore civil 
approaches have been discussed and included in peacekeeping missions. The underlying 
argument suggests that a successful peacekeeping needs to consider social lines of 
conflicts and guarantee human rights. But how are civil approaches implemented into 
peacekeeping missions? Beneath the formal acknowledgement of civil approaches, are 
there successful best practices to reach a long lasting peace? 
 
Another argument brought by the ICISS is the “responsibility to protect” (ICISS 2001). It is 
not only the state that is responsible for the protection of its people, but also the 
international community if the state is unable or unwilling to protect its population. The 
temporary influence on the sovereignty of a nation state – which is no longer a holy entity 
                                                     
1 Compare also the notion of failed states: Failed states are characterised by descending internal and 
external state legitimacy, by weak societal solidarity and by reduced functions and capabilities of action. This 
is related to the reduced/lacking monopoly of force and of political power control, and to the limited rule of 
law that cause destabilisation of neighbour states or even of the international community. (Rotberg 
2002:127; Thürer 2008:42f.) 
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of the international system in a globalised world - and its monopole of power are some of 
the most discussed topics in relation to the end of conflicts. The responsibility to protect 
against genocide or large scale killings is regarded as emerging norm in the international 
system (Breau 2007:436; White 2009:344). The UN peacekeeping missions have become 
a rather neutral mean of conflict solution and are regarded as third-party intervention. As 
diverse research shows, outcome of UN peacekeeping missions in the field is diverse.  
 
UN peacekeeping has been established as a mean to guarantee peace as a basis for 
development. It is particularly military engagement relying on troops contributed by 
member states of the UN. The UN has several organisations that should ensure more 
respect for human rights and other development factors that are related to the civil sector. 
The question emerges, whether military peacekeeping missions are linked to civil 
approaches. Those might be approaches of other UN bodies (like UN OCHA) or even 
direct engagement within the civil sector in the countries. To build a sustainable peace it 
seems to be crucial to include the local population and to combine civil and military 
approaches from the beginning. It is argued, that military means are not the most accepted 
one, because they include a repressive instrument, are not principally protecting civilians 
or are simply not suited for addressing social conflicts. Hypothetically military missions can 
become more accepted when they include civil approaches, above all the protection of 
civilians. However, UN peacekeeping has not ever been aware of this. The UN missions in 
Rwanda 1994 (UNAMIR) and in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) failed to prevent genocide or ethnic 
cleansing which mark a crucial point in the history of UN peacekeeping missions (White 
2009:341).  
 
The UN accepted this problem (compare UN 2010a) and topics like the protection of 
women against rape seem to be included in newer missions. Overall, more theoretical 
questions of relations between peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peacemaking need to be 
discussed as well. 
 
The central research question is: How are UN peacekeeping missions linked to civil 
approaches? 
 
Other emerging questions are: What are connections between military and civil 
engagement today?  
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Did the UN learn from its failure and include a stronger civil component, or is it divided 
between several UN agency approaches?  
 
The paper has a biased basis for research as classical UN peacekeeping missions are 
primarily not civilian. However, even the notion of peacekeeping developed over time as 
will be discussed later. It might be concluded, that UN peacekeeping comprises primarily 
military operations and is therefore free of any civil approaches. This result could be linked 
to the question of efficiency in UN peacekeeping missions which is only partly touched in 
this paper.  The assumption that civil factors should be included is not taken for granted, 
but it will be argued, that there are reasons to include those. To answer the question 
whether civil approaches are useful for the overall success of a peacekeeping mission 
further research is to be conducted and this comparative case can to a small degree 
contribute. Furthermore, main actors within the puzzle of peacekeeping should be 
identified.  
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2. The development of UN peacekeeping 
Most scholars see the beginnings of peacekeeping in 1956 with the UNEF in the Suez 
Canal War where the main objective was to separate belligerents (Bures 2008:25; 
Landshuter 2007:1). During the Cold War, peace operations were not often performed 
because of the division of the decision taking body – the Security Council - into different 
blocks while they increased in numbers after 1990 (MacQueen 2008:184;). It turned again 
down after 1994 with lacking confidence in peacekeeping and revived after 2001 and the 
start of the war on terror (Woodhouse/Ramsbotham 2005:142). Overall, there have been 
more than sixty UN peacekeeping operations since the first one and more than 46 since 
1989, although the term peacekeeping not appears in the UN charter until today 
(MacQueen 2008:182; Blocq 2006:203).  
 
Under UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali the protection of UN personnel was most 
important for missions (Sitkowski 2006:15). The notion of classical peacekeeping has been 
slightly connected with peacebuilding by the intervention in Namibia in 1990 and mission 
objectives became more complex (Olsson 2001:97, Salomons 2005:27). Major events like 
the ethnic cleansing in Srebrenica or the genocide in Rwanda aside of an UN operation led 
to the discussion of effectiveness. Under Secretary General Annan the topic was faced by 
the report on UN peace operations – commonly called the Brahimi report in 2000 – which 
challenged the former notion of peacekeeping (UN 2000; Landshuter 2007:1). In the terms 
of collective human security people are no longer only citizens of a state, but also part of a 
“global, state-transcending, community” (Blocq 2006:204).  This makes the international 
community responsible for protection of every human being. Peacekeeping became one of 
UN’s core functions and should ensure that the country in question becomes self-
sustaining (Woodhouse/Ramsbotham 2005:148 UN 2000:2).  
 
Why has it become necessary to modify the peacekeeping approach that was used during 
the Cold War and afterwards?  
 
Recently the debate on peacekeeping missions is no longer a debate to restore the 
statehood and then leave the state in question on its own. Even in cases where the 
monopole of power has been restored by multidimensional peacekeeping missions, the 
peace results were not an overall success (Landshuter 2007:99). The underlying causes of 
conflict have been ignored sometimes by peacekeeping missions. It was assumed that 
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peacekeeping is a precondition for peacebuilding. The latter would address civil factors 
and develop towards a human rights respecting democratic political system in the host 
country. Today, both terms are not that clear as will be discussed in the theory chapter. It 
is no longer taken for granted that every state with a monopole of power is capable or 
willing of guaranteeing freedom from immanent threats. The new definition of warfare 
including inner state conflicts like fighting warlords means also that ceasefires and peace 
agreements do not mean an end of violence (Landshuter 2007:59). 
 
The UN approach of peace and thereby of security developed over time. It is no longer just 
military security, but rather a freedom from all immanent threats of death. Sovereignty is 
therefore not more important than facing threats to peace (Harper 2005:33). Insecurity can 
be a way to assure wealth and control over decisive resources and be a mean for 
recruitment or political pressure. Failed states have been identified as security threats that 
have to be faced on an international level and the concept of statehood has been recently 
challenged (Jackson/Sørensen 2007:270f.2). Conflicts have become more complex and 
also asymmetric, with not only state-centred conflicts, but intra-state conflicts, conflicts 
between states and groups or between states and international actors.  
 
A growing international civil society community compromising such actors like Human 
Rights Watch or Amnesty International have become powerful actors and can use their 
influence not only on states and its people but also on international organisations like the 
UN. Furthermore, actors have become globally connected meaning that the 
interrelationship not only between regional or national actors, but also horizontal between 
international and regional actors is complex (Landshuter 2007:21). 
 
The UN was faced with genocide and ethnic cleansing and was unable to react in Rwanda 
and Bosnia. It was until the change of the Secretary General towards Kofi Annan, when 
own failure in peacekeeping missions has been acknowledged and new guidelines have 
been issued. The main consequences that were elaborated were more Chapter VII (of the 
UN charter) – peacekeeping through use of force - operations and the new interpretation 
of the basic principles of peacekeeping (impartiality, consensus of the parties and use of 
force as self-defence). Until the late 1990s most peacekeeping operations were Chapter VI 
operations that were restricted in their use of force for protection of civilians. Although 
                                                     
2 the source also provides a more detailed overview on the changing notions of statehood and new issues in 
International Relations. 
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peacekeeping was not ever regarded as only military engagement, other measures than 
military ones where often not that popular. Today, peacekeeping is more than just military 
engagement and scholars see civil approaches like the protection of human rights as 
crucial for the later success of peace and the mission (Hannum 2006:5). The UN itself 
accepted a new doctrine within DPKO in 2008, that  acknowledged that overall consent is 
not in every case achievable and that protection mandates should be effective because 
research showed, that although protection mandates exist, those are rarely used in 
practice (White 2009:349). 
 
Main actors of UN peacekeeping on the international level are the UN Security Council 
(SC), the UN Secretariat, troop contributing governments and the military personnel in the 
field (Sitkowski 2006:21). The Department for peacekeeping operations (DPKO) and the 
Department for Political Affairs (DPA) are further principal actors within the UN system, like 
also the OHCHR that work not ever harmonious (Hannum 2006:22f.). Regional actors and 
regional peacekeeping to ensure better trained, more familiar and better equipped 
peacekeepers have been promoted through the last years (Woodhouse/Ramsbotham 
2005:144; White 2009:352). The Brahimi report urged for deploying personnel that meets 
UN peacekeeping training and equipment requirements and that the recruitment of civilian 
specialist should be enforced (UN 2000:4). The number of actors in UN peacekeeping 
missions has increased, but not all actors have been identified and it remains open, if 
every actor in the international system can become peacekeeper.  
 
The main challenges of the notion of the term peacekeeping and its interchangeable use 
with peacebuilding, peacemaking or peace enforcement is to be discussed in the chapter 
on peacekeeping. This is a question of principle direction and possibilities of UN 
peacekeeping missions. The term civil approaches will be clarified within the methodology 
chapter.   
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Elaboration of problem formulation 
The central question is about the relation between UN peacekeeping missions and civil 
approaches. A comparative case study is chosen to allow generalisation or comparison for 
best practices. This is particularly related to the area of conflict and military intervention 
with the need to include civil approaches to achieve better long term results. It is not only a 
question whether those approaches can be combined and whether there are positive 
examples for comprehensive approaches, but also whether it is desirable to combine. 
Perhaps it would be more effective to start with intervention and then proceed towards civil 
reconstruction and the restoring of respect for human rights. This would support classical 
peacekeeping. However, this paper supports the opposing hypothesis of development and 
enlargement of peacekeeping simultaneously although it is not taken for granted.  
 
While analysis of peacekeeping can focus on the onset of the mission (why it exists), on 
the type of operation (which form of peacekeeping), and on the success of a mission 
(Bures 2007:429), this paper largely analyses the outcome or form with some insights on 
the success of the three chosen missions in relation to their mandate.  
 
The focus of analysis is on a sub national or national level. Three different UN 
peacekeeping missions will be regarded in detail. This is particularly interesting as there is 
a lack of comparative case studies.  
 
What theories can effectively face peacekeeping on an international and national/sub 
national level? This question and the question what peacekeeping is are important to 
explain the point of view of the study. Furthermore, the question of what civil approaches 
are will be discussed. Every researcher might apply a different set of ideas and 
perceptions and it becomes crucial to explain those theoretical thoughts to make them 
retraceable.  
 
When applying the method and the theory on the three cases, main questions about the 
civil approaches used in the different peacekeeping missions and their impact emerge. To 
identify some best practices, positive examples should be high lined.  It might be that civil 
approaches are not dominant in the mission. This would be an explanation of success or 
failure of a mission. The cases under research are actual cases and it might be too early to 
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define overall success or failure, but indications in the one or the other direction might be 
identifiable.  
 
3.2 Cases and variables 
The paper is a qualitative comparative case study. The research is exploitative meaning 
that it states and researches new insights (McGivern 2006). UN peacekeeping missions 
are analysed as there is a lack of research on that theme. The three cases of actual 
peacekeeping missions are MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UNMIL in 
Liberia and UNMIK in Kosovo. As Africa has the highest rate of peacekeeping operations 
in comparison to other continents, it is represented by two cases, while the case of Kosovo 
is one outside Africa. The choice of cases might enable a more detailed view on different 
actors as other actors may be involved in those cases (more European involvement in 
Kosovo due to geographical proximity). Further research could enable a more 
comprehensive view including insights from Asia or the Americas. 
It can be expected that the three chosen cases have different foci as they have different 
histories of warfare (e.g. failed states and/or ethnic conflicts). The complexity of conflicts in 
contemporary international relations is represented here. Actual peacekeeping missions 
with some preceding missions have been chosen as the actual political shifts in the UN 
system have been launched after 2000 and older missions would not include recent 
changes. The human security approach and the importance of civil factors have gained 
more attention in the last years. All three missions are continuing missions although they 
might end in the nearer future. The ongoing missions cause some difficulties as sources 
for analysis have to be international agency groups or primary documents by the UN 
because scholarly analysis is rare.  
 
If the cases are lead by DPA or DPKO is actually not important for the choice of the cases, 
but it is one aim of this paper to identify different actors that are involved in the mission. 
Examples of inter-agency relations on the ground will be identified and different 
perceptions will be described in this paper. 
 
The aim of this study is to analyse how civil approaches are included in UN peacekeeping 
missions. Their inclusion is expected because of recent changes in focus of UN 
peacekeeping missions. Formal provisions and practical insights of each mission are 
analysed separately. Both will be regarded in detail after explaining the lines of conflict for 
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each case to enable a discussion of implementation. The formal analysis will focus on 
main documents that build the context of the peacekeeping mission in question like SC 
resolutions.  The second part of analysis focuses on practical insights of how the formal 
provisions are implemented. The implementation is assumed to differ from formal 
provisions, as miscellaneous actors within the UN interpret formal documents variously 
and may therefore cause diverse effects on the mission. Both parts of the analysis will be 
researched according to factors and functions identified in the theory chapter. 
 
3.3 The civil approach 
Civil approaches are measures that are aimed to achieve peacekeeping targets by civil 
means (e.g. police missions, NGO enforcement or HR-work, drug eradication or disaster 
relief) and are operations other than war (Diehl/Druckman/Wall 1998:38). The civil 
approach mainly relates to the notion of human security. Human Security was first used by 
UNDP, but was adopted by UNICEF, FAO and WHO and later by Kofi Annan. It is defined 
as “to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and 
human fulfilment. Human Security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms 
that are the essence of life. [...] It means creating political , social, environmental, 
economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of 
survival, livelihood and dignity” (Commission on Human Security cited in Landshuter 
2007:105). It is furthermore not state-centred but a “value of global security” and therefore 
something post-westphalian (Woodhouse/Ramsbotham 2005:141). Human security aims 
protecting humanity from direct and indirect threats and humans learning to manage their 
lives and to live in community (Landshuter 2007:105). 
 
Civil approaches are not only the protection of civilians, while this can be a decisive 
element in UN peacekeeping operations and is highly valued in the UN system, but also 
aspects of rule of law or gender which become important in reconceptualising the conflict 
in countries in question. The importance of preventing the deliberate attack on civilians 
and the denial of humanitarian access has been stated as a threat for the international 
system by SC resolution 1296 (Woodhouse/Ramsbotham 2005:143). The “civilianization” 
of peace operations is already under way as White argues (White 2009:336f.). Overall civil 
approaches are a far-reaching term which in application results in only few measures. 
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One reason for a more detailed civil approach to peacekeeping is the solution of not only 
military conflict, but also other societal cleavages. It is additional to the military approach 
and encompasses a broader perspective. Some scholars argue that human security 
should protect individuals from systemic violence focussing on long-term solutions (White 
2009:334). Examples for civil measures are gender components, because women are 
disproportionately civilian victims and survivors of war, but can become agents of change 
(Carey 2001:50). This has also been acknowledged by SC Resolution 1325 (2000) that 
accepted women’s agency role in conflict (Hudson 2005:786). Rape is a “systematic 
weapon of war”, which destroys social relationships and expresses superiority (Skjelsbæk 
2001:79). Mackay assigns that the sensibilisation for gender issues has improved since 
2001, but that further training is necessary to socialise peacekeepers for gender specific 
problems (Mackay  2003:217ff.). This is an example of how civil approaches in form of 
monitoring, reporting and ideally prosecuting forms of sexual violence try to solve the 
deadlock of a conflict by trust-building in society. 
 
Other authors assign that it might be difficult to defend human rights or other civil 
component against other political needs. Phases of post-conflict emergency can lead to 
limitations of some human rights in favour of the stability of the country, which is criticised 
(Hannum 2006:49). The inclusion of mechanism that builds on trust and in overcoming 
societal conflicts becomes crucial. Therefore, “support of the local population, sensitivity to 
cultural context, and the need to build inclusive peace constituencies” has been identified 
by DPKO as important towards successful missions (Woodhouse/Ramsbotham 2005:144). 
Critics argue, that the mixture of aid, development and security has not led to advanced 
human security but to intervention of powerful states to stabilise third world countries and 
that securisation of humanitarian approaches leads to a “therapeutic notion of human 
security” (Woodhouse/Ramsbotham 2005:149a. 151). However, it is less that civil 
approaches are militarised, but that military approaches are civilised.  NGOs could provide 
services of a state, but it is still an open question whether NGOs should be included in 
official UN peacekeeping missions (Schnabel 1997:568). Already, relief organisations like 
the Red Cross are providing important services helping to prevent the immanent threat of 
death. The long-term aim of every mission is to ensure the peaceful existence of the state. 
Consequently the state in question must be able to provide the services that might 
temporarily be provided by UN troops.  
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Critics argue that peacekeeping and peacebuilding should be regarded separately. 
Peacekeeping personnel is not trained to perform civilian tasks, peacekeeping mandates 
are time limited and overall peacekeeping missions have limited capacity to adequately 
address the complexity of problems (Hazen 2007:329 a. 334). 
 
Civil approaches reach from measures to ensure the responsibility to protect the respect 
and enforcement of human rights to prevent under nourishment. It encompasses a wide 
variety of approaches therefore causing lack of focus of a mission. 
 
3.4 Sources 
As will be discussed later in detail, the peacekeeping approach is theoretically disputed 
and theory failed to develop accepted approaches. Studies that tested peacekeeping 
missions especially in civil wars showed contradictory results and there is furthermore a 
lack of large-n studies related to peacekeeping missions (Bures 2007:429). This makes 
the overall scientific basis more difficult to access. 
 
Hannum already emphasised the international interplay of UN agencies in peacekeeping 
operations. He concluded that it depends on the actual missions whether different UN 
departments like DPA or DPKO or the SC cooperate and to what extent (Hannum 
2006:49). He also criticised that there are few comparative case studies on UN 
peacekeeping and most of the scientific work has been done on single case studies 
without focusing on broader best practises. Other scholars, like Bures (2007:408 a.412), 
explicitly demand a more detailed comparative approach.  This approach could elaborate 
the interplay of several actors on a national and sub-national level (on the ground). This 
shall be a partial target of this paper, although it can not generate overall results for how to 
conduct peacekeeping.  
 
Bures already remarked, that most of the literature on peacekeeping missions is part of a 
single case study or is written by military personnel or diplomats that were part of a 
mission (Bures 2007:412).  This means that sources may not be completely neutral 
towards the topic they research. 
 
The sources of this paper are main articles and books in relation to theory by 
Jackson/Sørensen, Hannum, Bures, Landshuter and Murphy as well as several articles by 
 - 12 - 
Wendt, Diehl and other. For qualitative analysis of the data, most sources are international 
agencies like the International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch or the UN itself, but also 
scholarly articles where available (such as by Sitkowski). It has to be reflected that NGOs 
might be hypercritical in analysing military missions, while the UN might be uncritical 
towards its own missions although those are regularly reviewed. Furthermore, lobby 
groups like Human Rights Watch or Oxfam might have an own interest in using special 
examples of missions. This is accepted in the study and research studies are used 
wherever possible. In addition, it can be recognised that most of the studies on 
peacekeeping missions focus on the military aspect of the mission instead of analysing 
civil measures to ensure peace. 
  
Research papers or reports from local NGOs in the case countries are underrepresented. 
Due to the limited availability of reports by those NGOs and limited capacities of this 
paper, international sources are used. Due to the ongoing character of the case missions, 
it is difficult to find actual scholarly sources, as missions are mostly analysed after the end 
of a mission. 
 
Overall, secondary sources are used to provide an adequate basis for research. 
Qualitative research enables more validity but less reliability due to the limited design. By 
the use of various sources, reliability should be enhanced.  
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4. Discussion of the approach towards peacekeeping 
4.1.1 Realism 
The theoretical school of realism is divided into classical realist approaches and neorealist 
approaches. 
 
The classical realist approaches follow the theory of scholars like Machiavelli, Hobbes or 
Morgenthau and others (Jackson/Sørensen 2007:62ff.). The classical realist approach has 
a perspective on the individual in the tradition of a hobbesian thinking. Humanity is bad per 
se and everybody is the others enemy. Every human being pursues its own interest. This 
is also true for states. Due to the absence of a central authority in international relations, 
states are going to war with each other in order to maximise their interests. No state can 
be sure, that another state would attack it. Therefore, resources, defence and military 
budget are important values to determine a basis of power.  
 
Neorealists in the tradition of Kenneth Waltz argue that the state is a black box and that 
states are interest driven (like the realist tradition). The anarchic state system leads to war 
and violence in the international system. There is still no central authority. Neorealism 
evolved from realism, because realism was not able to explain the emergence of the UN or 
other cooperation. Why should someone cooperate, if everybody has to fear the other? 
Neorealism solves this problem in arguing, that states can be interest seeking or power 
seeking. Power seeking actors are the classical neorealist actors that are maximizing their 
power. However, interest seeking actors can be actors that are supporting stronger actors 
in exchange for their territorial autonomy. Cooperation can build power blocks to equal 
other blocks. Neorealism expects a relative equilibrium – and thereby peace - if too states 
are equally powerful (like during the Cold War). However, if the power of one great power 
diminishes, it is likely that new challengers arise and that the system becomes more 
pluralistic and consequentially more violently. The Cold War is an example for equalence 
of power. Today’s system is a multipolar system without a great hegemony (although the 
USA are most likely to be one), which leads to more violent conflicts. This might necessary 
peacekeeping because states have an interest in other states. It might be mostly in the 
interest of ambitious developing states, while developed states might accept the status 
quo (Bures 2007:424). This helps to explain why peacekeeping missions are deployed 
towards in one conflict and not to another. One might argue, that e.g. the conflict in Yemen 
would necessary peacekeeping but due to a lack of international interest, there is no 
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mission.  However, realism has been supported by some findings of scholars, but mostly 
related to Cold War peacekeeping (Bures 2007:423f.). The relation to Cold War findings is 
criticised by scholars that refer to the complexity of contemporary conflicts and the inability 
of realism to explain it (Hudson 2005:790). 
 
4.1.2 Liberalism 
Contrary to classical approaches (realism, neorealism), which were limited in their ability to 
explain by the arising multilateralism and the end of the Cold War and thus set up the 
stage for new approaches, liberalism dislocated itself from the perception of states as 
closed entities. Liberalism emerged from the tradition of liberal thinkers like Kant or Locke 
and focuses on values like democratic government or welfare (Jackson/Sørensen 
2007:98). It has recently been influenced by scholars like Moravcsik, Rosenau or Haas 
(Schieder 2006:179). The focus is on the individual that is principally peace seeking and 
not – in contradiction to realism – every other’s enemy. Liberalism developed into different 
directions towards ideational liberalisms, republican peace liberalism or economic 
liberalism. All have a common focus on inner-state aspects for identifying decision making 
processes and on interconnectiveness between actors (Jackson/Sørensen 2007:104ff.). 
The individual’s interest is aggregated on a higher level like in a functional analysis or 
institutional approach through organisations or associations. Ideational liberalism focuses 
on ideas that have been realised on a national level and can be brought on the 
international level and on normative aspects for decision making (Schieder 2006:176). 
Economic liberalism focuses on peacebuiding aspects of economic issues. If national 
economies become more interconnected and interdependent, peace is more likely 
compared to cases where economies are loosely tied (Schieder 2006:178). Republican 
liberalism focuses on the peace bringing of democracy and its values (Jackson/Sørensen 
2007:111). This is argued on the basis of perceptions as “doves”; but also because 
democracy involves non-violent decision making processes that are replicated on an 
international level. 
 
Critics argue, that liberalism does not accept the realist assumption of anarchy in the 
international system and thereby concludes wrongly (Jackson/Sørensen 2007:118f.).  
 
Depending on the branch of liberalism applied, peacekeeping missions are regarded as 
sign of global idealism and cooperation, economic reconstruction and building of 
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interdependence or democratic enforcement. Hazen already underlines that peacekeeping 
rests on liberal models for democratic countries and free-market economies (Hazen 
2007:325). 
 
4.1.3 Constructivism  
Social constructivism is one fundamental perspective of this paper. Like liberalism, 
constructivism dissociates itself from the state as a black box and focuses on individuals 
(Jackson/Sørensen 2007:162). On the one hand it enables the view on conceptions and 
identities, on the other hand it opens the view on inclusion and exclusion of actors under 
and over-half the state level (Schieder 2006:182f.; Ulbert 2006:412). According to 
constructivism the world is linguistically, conceptually and symbolically constructed and 
identity perceptions, conceptions of the world, standards, ideas, interests and legitimating 
for actions are socially generated (Wendt 1992; Krell 2004:348). This does not mean that 
the world can not be a rational one if everyone defines it as such. States are also for 
constructivists the main actors of international relations; however, the essential structures 
of the international system have to be seen rather intersubjective (Jackson/Sørensen 
2007:166). Institutions - like the UN - appear as independent actors and can thereby 
change national interests as potential catalysts (Haas/Haas 2002; Wendt 1992; regarding 
the role of international organisations: Zürn/Checkel 2005). Institutions are sources of 
collective identities and values, which influence other collective or individual actors.  
 
Interactions and/or the process of socialisation can change identities and thus form 
collective identities and interests (see illustration 1; Wendt 1994). If actors interact, they at 
least think about the other’s (people, institutions) ideas and might potentially find 
something convincing. The emergence of new ideas that could be adopted by actors and 
can become dominating is a main contribution of constructivism to theories of international 
relations (Jackson/Sørensen 2007:162). Therefore, interaction forms a substantial 
necessity for the change of identities, ensuring also mutual exchange, which can 
strengthen identities. However, this means also that change of identities is incremental.  
 
Perceptions are based on both an individual and a collective perception (Wendt 1994; 
referring also to the distinction made by Mead between „Me “and „I “: Mead 1973). 
Identities (individual as well as collective) are consequently held as relatively stable, role-
specific, constructed individual understandings and expectations and regarding 
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communities as collective expectations (Williams 2001). If actors identify themselves with 
one another due to different factors such as culture, nationality or common values etc. they 
cause positive effects and/or positive mutuality for inter-individual processes 
(Wren/Mendoza 2004). It can be argued, that for example the UN act to promote a “human 
we-feeling”, the freedom from threat of life or the universality of human rights. International 
organisations like the UN propose wide patterns of values that are multiplied by several 
UN agencies. International NGOs like HRW or AI can be seen as aggregated identities 
that defend values and norms. 
 
Constructivism forms „only” a meta-theory or social theory and requires other more 
concrete theories to obtain results (Risse 1999; Jackson/Sørensen 2007:164). Therefore 
the theory of peacekeeping and aspects of liberalism are used as medium-range theory to 
concretise constructivism and provide a level of analysis. Critics of constructivism deny the 
extent ideas are important proposed by constructivism or that states and/or the 
international system are seen as only actors of international relations (Jackson/Sørensen 
2007:173). 
 
In relation to peacekeeping, the question emerges, why is there a decision for 
peacekeeping in the international system? Constructivism would answer that there is a 
common perception of threat for international peace that obliges the SC to act and to 
decide in favour of a mission. All contributing parties would therefore tribute their capacity 
to succeed in maintaining peace and to show international solidarity. Constructivists would 
focus on dialogue and transformation of societal perceptions in countries where 
peacekeeping missions have been deployed (Hazen 2007:325). The highest norm in the 
international system would be protection of international peace. 
 
4.1.4 The approach towards peacekeeping 
The realist approach suits well when it is assumed that actors within the state are 
influenced by the international system. Liberalism and constructivism focus more on the 
influence of national or regional actors that are regarded as crucial for a national or sub 
national analysis as conducted in this paper. 
 
Why are peacekeeping missions conducted? Developing countries gain money and 
influence from the UN and can get heard. Realists argue that developing countries 
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generate interest. Developed countries however, have no real interest in UN peacekeeping 
missions because their interests are better served by unilateral or regional coalitions. 
Salomons argues that peacebuilding missions are performed where no powerful member 
state of the UN has an interest in, or where powerful actors failed to be successful 
(Salomons 2005:25). Overall, realists would argue that it is the international system that 
causes conflicts and that peacekeeping is only an attempt of developing countries to gain 
power. 
 
However, peacekeeping is also seen as ideal. The neutral UN is stabilising countries and 
emphasising peace and security. Every UN member state, sharing the ideals of the UN, 
should be willing to serve UN peacekeeping missions and to contribute to. This is not only 
shown by troop, but also by money contributions. Western3 countries may be reluctant to 
bring soldiers in conflict, but they financially contribute to peacekeeping missions. The 
ideal of consensual conflict solution is challenged by other ideals like the protection of own 
soldiers and unwill to deploy in UN peacekeeping missions, because it can not be justified 
through defence of fellow nationals or national values (Blocq 2009:291 a. 294). It also 
appears difficult to explain to publicity why a state should be engaged without immanent 
threat for the own country, but also why inactivity can be sustained facing human rights 
violations (Dandeker/Gow 19998:328; Schnabel 1997:565). 
 
It is not only the international community that is decisive, but also the role of national or 
regional actors, that could enable a successful transformation towards peace. The actor 
perspective by liberalism on other actors than states and the international system provides 
insights for analysing peacekeeping missions. Civil approaches would not be necessary, if 
factors within the state would not play a decisive role for the settlement. In relation to 
possible solutions to restore state functioning, liberalism provides an interesting 
perspective.  
 
Norms and values are shared among peacebuilders and it is a decisive element for trust of 
the local population. If the perceptions of the population towards peacekeepers are 
negative, there will not be a trust in the capabilities of the mission and peacekeepers may 
be unable to face the main challenges. This argument about perceptions is one of the 
                                                     
3 The West is normally defined as all NATO members, Australia and New Zealand: Heit (2005:727), 
Dougherty (2000:7), Gow 2005 :13.  
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positive values that constructivism can bring to the analysis. The constructivist approach is 
combined with actor’s actions by peacekeeping theory and by liberal level of analysis. 
Illustration 2 shows the main orientations of analysis.  
 
4.2 UN peacekeeping and its theory 
Despite several peacekeeping missions after the end of the Second World War, there is no 
commonly accepted theory of UN peacekeeping missions (Hazen 2007:324; MacQueen 
2008:182). The term itself was invented by Dag Hammerskjöld and Lester B. Pearson and 
is not part of the Charter of the UN (Bures 2007:412). A definition of peacekeeping by 
Boutros-Ghali describes it as “a technique that expands the possibilities for both the 
prevention of conflict and the making of peace” (Boutros-Ghali cited in MacQueen 
2008:183).  There exist other definitions4 that speak of “military missions with the consent 
of all major parties” (US Army 1994), or “actions designed to enhance international peace” 
(Pearson Peacekeeping Center 1996, all cited in Bures 2007:408f.). Peacekeeping 
missions are performed by international or national organisations and are not limited to the 
UN (Murphy 2007:1).  It encompasses civilian and military activities including the military 
maintenance of peace and this encloses a distinction between Westphalian and post-
Westphalian orientation of missions (Bures 2007:409 a. 411; Hannum 2006:7). Howland 
notes that human rights work is a relatively new toolbox for UN peacekeeping missions 
(Howland 2003:8). 
 
Scholars argue, that the concept of peacekeeping cannot be precisely described because 
it has become too large or misguiding and was also interpreted under different labels such 
as peace enforcement (Sitkowski 2006:13; Diehl/Druckman/Wall 1998:34). Bures argues 
in a similar direction by describing it as “a term that imparts virtually no information about 
what type of operation is actually taking place” and that there is inconsistency or no 
consensus on any type of definition (Bures 2007:409; Bures 2008:16a. 20). There exist 
further labels like peace enforcement, conflict resolution, peacebuilding, peacemaking, 
peace operation or classical and second generation peacekeeping. Some authors even 
argue to drop the term peacekeeping because it can be confused with UN past military 
missions which were distinct from today’s (Sitkowski 2006:150). Frequently, a classical 
approach with a distinction between peace ensuring peacekeeping and later peacebuilding 
                                                     
4 For a more detailed list of definitions: Bures 2007:408ff., Bures 2008:19, also Murphy 2007:2ff. 
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focusing on good governance, humanitarian assistance and other civil factors is used, 
although the line between both terms recently became narrow (White 2009:339f.).  
 
In this paper, peacekeeping is seen as a generic term for UN SC authorised deployment of 
military and civil personnel to ensure sustainable peace. This definition is broad to 
encompass all forms of peacekeeping and peacemaking and should deliberate itself from 
older notions of peacekeeping. The classical distinction between peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding is not followed because it appears too limited towards approaches where 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding are performed simultaneously. Peacekeeping includes 
the whole range of actions that are related to ensuring sustainable peace. The definition 
includes the SC to exclude UN agency activities that are not related to official 
peacekeeping missions. This paper only focuses on the UN controlled peacekeeping 
missions and not on missions, that are independently performed by regional actors like the 
NATO. It is necessary to specify different forms of peacekeeping missions.  
 
UN peacekeeping missions generally fall under two legal sources, that are Chapter VI 
(pacific settlement of disputes) and Chapter VII (action with respect to threats to the 
peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression) of the UN charter (Sitkowski 
2006:13). While chapter VI operations are consent based, chapter VII missions are 
coercion based and are more peace-enforcement also against conflict parties (Bures 
2008:17). Some scholars argue that it is more an article VI and a half, which would 
adequately describe UN peacekeeping (Landshuter 2007:55). The main point of referall is 
threats to international peace. Acts of aggression among states, but also rebellion and 
nuclear arms programs, and even refuge flows, state collapse, massive human rights 
abuse, overthrow of democratically elected governments, HIV/Aids or international 
terrorism have been regarded as threats to international peace (Bures 2008:18). 
 
UN peacekeeping consists originally of the three parts consent of the parties to the 
conflict, impartiality, and the non-use of force except for self-defence (UN 2000:2, Ill. 2). 
The three core components have been questioned over time. Critics argue that consent of 
the parties is difficult to identify because parties are not that clear and consent may 
change (Sitkowski 2006:14). The Brahimi report distinguished between neutrality and 
impartiality and defines impartiality as respect to the principles of the (UN) Charter and for 
the mandate’s objectives (MacQueen 2008:192). This would be less important in the case 
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of Chapter VII operations were troops are authorised to use “all necessary means as 
compulsory measures. A too extensive enforcement interpretation challenges the non-use 
of force and will become important in the following analysis.  
 
Theorists distinguish between classical peacekeeping – interposition of troops between 
belligerents - , second generation peacekeeping – consent of the parties and political 
reconstruction - or the newest form of third generation peacekeeping – robust mandates 
with comprehensive agreements (Bures 2007:409; Woodhouse/Ramsbotham 2005:139). 
Other scholars divide peacekeeping into six or more generations or types as ill. 6 shows. It 
is argued that a clear historical development is difficult to identify, because types of 
generations mixed (Bures 2007:410). The UN itself has no clear difference between types 
and different components are mixed like shown in ill. 7. Following, the distinction in three 
phases is used to keep theory small. Peacekeeping operations evolved from patrolling in 
demilitarised areas and observation of ceasefires to “deployment in complex emergencies 
of components such as civil administration and police, electoral units, and humanitarian 
agencies” (Sitkowski 2006:13; Landshuter 2007:52). This is also accepted by the Brahimi 
report, where the notion of classical peacekeeping developed towards more complex and 
also civil elements (UN 2000:2). UN peacekeeping has become accepted among states 
because it appears as being neutral between states (Landshuter 2007:51). Peacekeepers 
have furthermore to coordinate with various NGOs and IGOs in the field (Bures 2008:43).  
All cases analysed are expected to fall in third generation peacekeeping.  
 
Various functions and factors exist that help analysing missions (Johansen referred to by 
Bures 2008:22). Those are the involvement of violent or non-violent actors, consent of 
parties for a mission or small sized, as well as large and complex missions among several 
other functions. Ill. 8 distinguishes those functions according to their military, political or 
humanitarian notion. This is also reflected in the different orientations of peacekeeping 
missions like observation, arms control verification or state building among others. 
Woodhouse and Ramsbotham argue, that peacekeeping can be seen with the aim to 
restore the state-centric power structure, but also within a cosmopolitan notion like 
protection of civilians from violent conflict and the correspondence with the human security 
agenda (Woodhouse/Ramsbotham 2005:140; Blocq 2009:294). Bellamy, Williams and 
Griffin distinguish between Westphalian and Post-Westphalian orientation that is related to 
the main orientation of peacekeeping (Ill. 5; Bures 2007:411). This is also a classical 
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division between a realist and a more liberal perspective on the topic. It is argued, that a 
distinction between civil or military approaches is useful for analyses, analogue towards 
the approach of Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (ill.3). Westphalian or post-westphalian 
peacekeeping relate to the distinction between civilian and military orientation although 
both terms are influencing each other. 
 
Peacekeeping missions can be interpreted by their success. According to scholars, factors 
of success can be the fulfilment of the purpose of the mission as stated in the mandate, 
the impact of the operation on the local population (although it is not clear to what it shall 
be compared), the manner in which the mission has been accomplished and the 
contribution of peacekeeping to larger values (Bures 2007:414f.). However, success is 
also dependend on the country’s capacities, the depth of war-related hostility and 
international assistance (Bures 2007:421). Notwithstanding several other factors, civilian 
security through police and juridicial reform and local capacity building are low cost 
opportunities that are relatively easy to achieve (Bures 2007:422). 
Quantitative analysis showed, that the conditions for successful peacekeeping operations 
are limited, which is also due to the restrictions in peacekeeping strategies (Bures 
2007:414). A large n-study by Fortna showed overall peacekeeping being contributing to 
more stable peace and is deployed in severe conflicts when peacekeeping is most needed 
(Fortna 2003:98ff.).  
 
Peacekeepers have to defend civilians who are in need of protection where the local 
authorities are not able to render assistance like assigned by the ICISS (Blocq 
2006:205;ICISS 2001:XII). If the human security approach is applied, then the 
responsibility to protect not only includes freedom of immanent threat of dead like sufficient 
nutrition, but also basic human rights and the respect for them. The approach becomes 
broader, which needs to be handled in form of sufficient capacity building.  
 
For military missions, appropriateness of the troop in relation to equipment, the relation 
between number and area to be controlled, and the capacities of military personal, is 
important facing the mandate (and it’s financing). It needs to be considered, that 
peacekeeping cannot achieve an ideal state of peace (Bures 2007:414). 
 
 - 22 - 
Peacekeeping can be linked to conflict management and conflict resolution approaches.  
While conflict management – preventing escalation- mostly reflects the first generation and 
Westphalian peacekeeping, conflict resolution - became a focus of the more complex and 
wider missions of the post Cold War era. In conflict resolution theory it can be stated, that 
regional mediation and approaches served best for the enforcement of the security 
situation (Berkovitch/Gartner 2006:331; Frazier/Dixon 2006:394). Scholars argue, that 
limited or impartial intervention is destructive for a peace process and for diplomatic 
settlement (Bures 2007:418;Greig/Diehl 2005:639 a. 642). Bures argues, that there are 
fields, that have been ignored by scholars studying peacekeeping like the impossibility of a 
military “quick fix” or the positive examples of “local level cross-community peacebuilding 
work” (Bures 2007:419).  
 
The UN constructed several sub-identities like DPA or DPKO. The Department for Political 
Affairs is a “lead department” for peacemaking and conflict peacebuilding and elaborates 
political solutions for the conflicts, although it is more important on the international level, 
because it has few field offices (Hannum 2006:9f. a.14). The other main UN agency is 
DPKO which is responsible for every peacekeeping mission, while other agencies like 
UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, the ITU or UNIFEM provide also capacities for countries (Hannum 
2006:12 a. 25). Since 1999, human rights approaches have been included in every DPKO-
led mission (Hannum 2006:12). Cooperation between UN and other organisations are 
loosely coupled, mostly ad hoc and depend largely on personalities and their relation in the 
field although Landshuter sees potential for multiple problem solving communities if 
cooperation occurs (Landshuter 2007:93). She underlines, that a multiplicity of problem 
solving approaches working simultaneously enables positive synergy effects instead of 
strict separation of tasks (Landshuter 2007:94 a. 190). The involvement of miscellaneous 
actors might cause problems for the outcome of every peacekeeping mission if different 
agencies do not cooperate or even oppose. The Brahimi report already assigned, that the 
UN system needs integrated planning approaches where all different tasks from political 
analysis to humanitarian assistance need to be coordinated (UN 2000:5). 
 
Peacekeeping missions are deployed to ensure a long lasting peace, although their 
deployment is often made on short term orientation. The theoretical approach according to 
illustration 3 is used. They can have various tasks, but are mainly related to restoring the 
functioning of a state.  
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5.Analysis 
5.1 MONUC 
5.1.1 Lines of conflict in the DRC 
After the end of the Mobutu regime (1965-1997), Laurent Kabila became president. 
Before, the country was ruled by dictatorship, mismanagement and widespread corruption. 
After the clash of the Kabila coalition and the uprising of the RCD supported by Rwanda 
and Uganda in 1998, Kabila gained support from Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, which 
led to the involvement of seven countries and ten rebel groups in a war that is sometimes 
described as the ‘African World War’ in the Great Lakes region (Daley 2006:307; 
Smis/Oyatambwe 2002:411f). In the DRC existed and do still exist various fighting groups 
like the FNL, Interwahawe, PARECO, FRF, Mayi-Mayi, LRA and others. While the FNL 
has been defeated, the FDLR and LRA among others are still active. In 1998 the Lusaka 
Peace Accords have been accepted but were rather a ceasefire than a solution of the 
conflict (Daley 2006:312). 
Laurent Kabila has been assassinated in 2001 which led in combination with a change in 
the international perception on the conflict including the illegal exploitation of resources to 
new possibilities of action (Smis/Oyatambwe 2002:412). Laurent Kabila’s son Joseph 
Kabila became his successor and was later elected president of the DRC.  
 
During the last two decades or even longer, the DRC had no authority that was able to 
reach every end of the country. Furthermore, conflict parties were not aligned with clear 
coalitions but changed in relation to international support they got, while human rights 
violations were already common in 2002 (Smis/Oyatambwe 2002:414).  
In 2004 heavy fighting erupted in the Bukavu region, showing that the situation is not 
stable (Schimmel 2006:307). The DRC has several resources including strategic minerals 
like Coltan or Diamonds, which are connected to the international market and which have 
been used as a resource for rebel groups financing (Daley 2006:306f.). Factors like the 
huge territory of the country are triggers for fighting. The DRC is still regarded as a failed 
state and ranked on place five by the failed state index 2009 (Foreign Policy 2009)5. 
 
 
                                                     
5 The Failed State Index is an index elaborated by the Fund for Peace’s Conflict Assessment Tool and 
includes the 12 variables: Demographic Pressures, Refugees/IDPs, Group Grievance, Human Flight, 
Uneven Development, Economic Decline, Delegitimization of the State, Public Services, Human Rights, 
Security Apparatus, Factionalized Elites, and External Intervention. Also it is basically accepted research, it 
needs to be underlined that the Fund for Peace pursues its own interests.  
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5.1.2 Formal provisions 
The MONUC started with UN SC resolution 1279 (1999) and had originally a strength of 
500 military observers (UN SC 2010b:7). The original authorisation focused on collecting 
and verification of military information (MONUC 2010). The MONUC has been enlarged 
with a chapter VII mandate in February 2000 by the SC resolution 1291 and encompassed 
5.537 peacekeepers, which was modified in 2003 by resolution 1493 towards 10.800 
troops, and in 2004 by resolution 1565 towards 16.500 peacekeepers (UN SC 2010b:7). 
Finally, resolution 1856 (2008) enlarged the overall number of MONUC personnel towards 
19.815 military personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police personnel and 1.050 
personnel in formed police units (MONUC 2010). The mission has been enlarged after 
millions of death and pressure from human rights organisation although the Secretariat 
requested even more troops (Howard 2008:307).   
 
Between 2003 and 2008, SC resolutions 1468 (2003), 1485 (2003), 1843 (2008) and 1856 
(2008) modified the mandate towards facilitating the work of the Ituri Peace Commission, 
support for legislation, electoral processes and security sector reform, as well as stabilising 
the Kivus together with the FARDC, finally concentrating on Eastern Congo to find lasting 
solutions (UN SC 2010b:7f.). As Sitkowski points out, the mandate originally contained 
only monitoring, disengagement of forces and withdrawal of foreign troops but developed 
towards support for the government and disarmament of combatants and a robust 
mandate (Sitkowski 2006:75;Woodhouse/Ramsbotham 2005:142).  
Especially the protection of civilians from physical violence and assisting vulnerable 
groups such as women, children and demobilised child soldiers is emphasised by MONUC 
(MONUC 2010). The situation in the DRC has been regarded as a “threat to international 
peace and security” by SC resolution 1291 (Breau 2007:446). This notion developed over 
time and it is argued, that it was only regarded as regional threat at the missions 
beginning. On December 23, 2009 the SC renewed MONUC’s mandate until May 31, 2010 
with resolution 1906 (UN SC 2010b:1). 
 
The mandate includes a DDRRR mandate where all forces in DRC except governmental 
forces should be disarmed, demobilised, repatriated (because large numbers of fighters 
have foreign origins) and reintegrated on the basis of incentives like limited amnesty 
(Smis/Oyatambwe 2002:427). Those being suspected of genocide, war crimes or crimes 
against humanity should originally be transferred to the International Criminal Court for 
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Rwanda. Main strategic goals of the mission are addressing ongoing conflicts, stabilising 
the conflict affected areas, consolidating peace and making development viable (UN SC 
2010b:6). On November 11, 2009, the SC stated by resolution 1894 that MONUC should 
act with appropriate measures to respond to the targeting of civilians (Human Rights 
Watch 2009c:2). The mandate encompasses a wide variety of topics like “protection of 
civilians; the monitoring, protection and promotion of human rights; facilitation of the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance; […] coordination of international efforts in security 
sector reform; coordination and implementation of mine-action activities; supporting the 
building of the capacity of national institutions, including FARDC, police capacities and 
strengthening the juridical and correctional systems; strengthening democratic elections 
and the rule of law; and addressing the illegal exploitation of natural resources” (UN SC 
2010b:8). Good governance and reconciliation and internal dialogue as well as the 
enhancement of local NGOs are further goals of the mission (MONUC 2010). 
 
MONUC is a DPKO lead mission, includes a human rights section and there has an 
independent expert on human rights and an OHCHR field presence in the DR Congo 
(Hannum 2006:26). It has furthermore integrated mission management structures to 
ensure coherence of approaches (Coning 2010:14). 
 
Between February and March 2010 the Secretary General conducted a multi-agency6 
assessment mission to figure out prospects for a drawdown of MONUC (UN SC 2010b:9). 
MONUC plans to focus on LRA and FDLR neutralising, completing DDRRR, protection of 
civilians, ensuring the capacity of the Congolese government to protect its citizens on its 
own, restoring state authority, addressing illegal exploitation and community bases 
resolution of land disputes (UN SC 2010b:20). MONUC recommended a justice support 
programme and plans a drawback focusing on Western provinces and later on the Kivus 
on a period of around three years (UN SC 2010b:21). 
After the end of the military mission, MONUC should focus on civilian components to 
ensure a presence throughout the country (UN SC 2010b:23).  The Congolese 
government wished a faster withdrawal of MONUC until June 2011 which finally led to the 
compromise that MONUC partly (2.000 troops) withdraws apart from June 2010 (UN SC 
2010b:23f.).  
                                                     
6 Organisations included were DPKO, DPA, Department for Field Support, Department for Safety and 
Security, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Office of the UNHCHR, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP 
and UNHCR.  
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5.1.3 Practical insights 
The DRC has 50 million in population and is half huge as all Western European countries 
together thereby reducing the chances of monitoring (Howard 2008:307). Main problems 
remain the continuing presence of militias, large-scale humanitarian needs, serious human 
rights violations, illegal exploitation of natural resources, intercommunity tensions and 
limited state presence (UN SC 2010b:6f.). It is argued that the DRC is not a stable country, 
facing insurgencies like in October 2009 shrinking the control over the whole country. LRA 
and FDLR pose main threats to security in parts of the country while national security 
institutions are responsible for human rights violations (UN SC 2010b:1a.3.). Overall, the 
DRC still faces structural and political weaknesses. 
 
The international perception on the conflict in Congo changed over time. Smis and 
Oyatambwe retraced the international perception from regional threat to peace and 
security, to more international involvement in form of initiatives by the Secretary General to 
the perception of an international threat by accepting binding resolutions on the theme 
apart from the Kisangani conflicts in 2000 (Smis/Oyatambwe 2002:423ff.). Some of the 
main relations between civil approaches and the peacekeeping missions will be high lined 
in the following.  
 
One main problem is the integration of the national army and the joint conduction of 
missions. In 2003 several armed groups have been integrated into the FARDC or political 
parties and the MONUC emphasises the success in integration although some of the 
groups established parallel administrative structures and collected taxes (MONUC 
2010b:2, UN SC 2010b:4). The DDRRR programme faced delays in submitting benefits for 
reintegration or disarmament and the Secretary General reports at least 8.000 combatants 
that have not received benefits since 2004 (UN SC 2010b:7). Critics argue that 
demobilised combatants or combatants that have been reintegrated in their home country 
(e.g. Rwanda) have been rerecruited by rebel groups, later entering again the process of 
demobilisation.  
The human rights division in MONUC further investigates cases of civilian causalities, rape 
or homes pillaged until 2004 (Schimmel 2004:307). Overall the human rights abuses have 
been criticised conducted also by UN personnel and related security institutions. 
This shows the overall interrelationship of military measures and civil impacts that 
necessary adequate reaction. MONUC includes a conditionality policy that should ensure 
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that MONUC only operates with FARDC commanders who do not have any documented 
human rights abuse record. MONUC did not adequately address the civilian problems that 
are produced by integration of former fighters into the armed forces. This supports the 
thesis, that peacekeepers need to be trained adequately in human rights, but must also 
identify with human rights (Blocq 2006:209). This is also true for related troops. 
 
MONUC built a Protection Unit for human rights defenders in 2007. The mandate foresees 
the direct protection of victims of sexual violence which was only partly implemented by 
relocating victims of sexual violence (Human Rights Watch 2009b:4). Scholars like Blocq 
criticise the discrepancy between the formal acceptance of protection of civilians and the 
willingness to do so in the DRC (Blocq 2006:206). Several scholars argue that MONUC 
failed to protect civilians and that it did not implement the chapter VII elements of the 
mandate (White 2009:349a. 353; Sitkowski 2006:26).  The responsibility to protect is one 
of the most visible signs in conflicts with UN peacekeeping engagements. It is therefore 
crucial not only for the population, but also for the international support of a mission. The 
responsibility to protect could not been ensured in DRV by MONUC. This is not only a 
question of resources, but also of acting as it behaves.  Beneath the failures of protection, 
UN troops have been accused to be implicated in sexual violence (Daley 2006:310).  
There are reports of sex scandals and sexual abuse including peacekeepers and 
peacekeepers have been prohibited of fraternising with the local population and become 
sensible for transactional sex. (Howard 2008:309; Simic 2009:293). MONUC includes a 
gender unit, that tried to raise awareness for gender issues through a website and through 
training of MONUC staff on gender issues (Hudson 2005:802). Although this unit exists, its 
impact is limited when facing problems concerning gender related violence in the country. 
Sexual exploitation by peacekeepers is “serious and on going” (Simic 2009:290) and 
sexual violence per se remains a major problem with around 15.000 cases reported in 
2009 (UN SC 2010:17). The mere existence of a gender unit did not suffice facing the 
great number of troops in the country and the need to train every peacekeeper in regular 
intervals.  
 
Administrative authorities commit serious human rights violations and violence and 
intimidation against human rights defenders is reported (UN SC 2010b:14). Topics like 
justice and reconciliation were not a priority of the mission, because security issues have 
been more prominent. 
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The UN learned and established Joint Protection Teams in “must-protect” areas (UN SC 
2010b:16). The practical implementation foresees equipment with mobile phones in local 
communities to call for protection if needed and to ensure direct contact with civil local 
communities. The efforts where regarded as successful and trust building. However, the 
JPTs remained constraint by resource lack and the Secretary General demanded a 
standing force, more resources and the combination with the established Rapid Response 
and Early Warning Cell that was established in cooperation with the Office for 
Humanitarian Affairs and the UNHCR (UN SC 2010:16). The UN tries to regain some trust 
that it lost before. The very positive insight is, that MONUC enhances its capacity with an 
interface between military and civilian orientation. The existing victim support and 
protection measures are mostly provided by Congolese and International NGOs (Human 
Rights Watch 2009b:3). 
 
Oxfam affirmed in 2007, that MONUC “has brought stability and security to large parts of 
the country” (Oxfam 2007). However, Oxfam also already assigned that MONUC 
overstretched its resources and that it should focus on protection of civilians. Oxfam 
criticised the UN involvement during operation Kimia II in 2009.  Kimia II was a mission 
against the local rebel organisation FDLR. The mission was conducted by the Congolese 
armed forces (FARDC) and caused massive humanitarian problems like rape, killing of 
civilians, destroyed villages and displaced persons not only by the FDLR but also by 
FARDC. Human Rights Watch documented cases of “horrific crimes against civilians” and 
“catastrophic” civilian costs7 during this operation (Human Rights Watch 2009c; Human 
Rights Watch 2009d). MONUC supports the FARDC with fuel, ground and tactical air 
mobility, medical and causality evacuation and food rations (UN SC 2010b:11).  This is 
especially crucial as MONUC indirectly supports human rights violations. Human Rights 
Watch and Oxfam argued, that although MONUC made “important efforts to protect 
civilians”, the implication as support provider for the Congolese army “undermined the 
mission’s primary objective” and implies MONUC in violations of laws of war (Human 
Rights Watch 2009c:2; Human Rights Watch 2009d:1; Oxfam 2010). MONUC conducted 
another mission in cooperation after the end of Kimia II (Operation Amani Leo), which also 
included human rights violations (UN SC 2010b:15).  
                                                     
7 Since January 2009 over 1.000 civilians have been killed, 7.000 women and girls been 
raped, over 6.000 homes burned and nearly 900.000 people been displaced (Oxfam 
2009:1; Human Rights Watch 2009:2). 
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Sitkowski argues neither impartiality, nor the use of force as self-defence or the consensus 
of the parties as indicated for UN missions has been respected in joint missions with the 
FARDC (Sitkowski 2006:7).  However, it is not the military mission per se, but rather the 
combination with the FARDC that brings problems of legitimacy. The UN ignores the 
impartiality in this mission and takes the government’s side. Furthermore, MONUC did not 
use its leverage on the Congolese government to remove human rights violators from 
FARDC (Oxfam 2009:2). Fighting the FDLR is necessary and has no other solution than a 
military victory, but there are other ways to ensure a peaceful Congo.  
 
MONUC not only transformed the military, but also the police and justice as part of the 
security sector reform. MONUC trained around over 8.000 police officers including more 
than 600 women in cooperation with other international organisations (SC 2010b:12). 
MONUC trained with UNDP military justice personnel, but had no capacity to face the 
“catastrophic conditions of detention” (UN SC 2010b:12). Overall, MONUC did not include 
a stronger transitional justice component apart from EU-led JURESCO, because of the 
focus on military appeasement.  
 
Public services and infrastructure are nearly nonexistent and societal communities are 
fragile after years of fighting, while the number of IDPs exceeds 1.000.000 (Howard 
2008:308; UN SC 2010b:14). There are still very few educational and economic 
possibilities that could pose incentives for an end of fighting. The situation on a civilian 
level is still unsatisfying.  
Positive examples exist: MONUC supported the several issues of transition and has been 
successful in establishing logistics capacities throughout the country that ensured the work 
of civilian and humanitarian efforts (UN SC 2010b: 6 a.27). The UN also used fast-impact-
projects8 in MONUC and Landshuter assigned that it has been widely successful in 
building trust among the population and missions have conducted with local projectors 
(Landshuter 2007:151). 
 
Lack of Learning and adoptions is a problem. Schimmel criticises the inability of taking 
lead-functions when facing human rights violations in 2004 and there has been at least the 
acknowledgement of malfunctions and failures of internal coordination by the DPKO Best 
                                                     
8 Fast-impact-projects are project with a volume of around US$ 1 million that aim to achieve miscellaneous 
aims at an early point of the mission. 
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Practices Section (Schimmel 2006:308). Howard also criticises the problems with first-level 
(on the ground) learning within MONUC especially in relation to the local environment, 
self-coordination and leadership (Howard 2008:309). MONUC learned at least at some 
points, but had problems to react ad-hoc on emerging topics. MONUC faces problems in 
communicating with the local population and authorities, but also between the field and 
headquarter (UN SC 2010b: 10; Howland 2004:9ff). Inadequate training is another general 
problem. The failures of MONUC to perform civilian tasks on a large scale can be retraced 
to lacking skills in organisation that are needed to limit damage and to lacking contact 
skills9. 
Another note by the Secretary General stated aside in his latest report is the outstanding 
financial assessments of over US$ 3.000 million (UN SC 2010b:25). There arise several 
problems that are not yet included in UN peacekeeping approaches and it exists a need 
for more capacities. MONUC increased patrols in the fighting affected area and 
investigated massacres in the areas where the LRA operates, but the Secretary General 
also called for more military capacities to fight LRA effectively (UN SC 2010b:3). MONUC 
also accepted the need for more civilian measures in fighting and reintegration LRA 
fighters (UN SC 2010b:3).  The existence of actors profiting from war is still a problem 
(Delay 2006:313). 
 
MONUC has not been provided with sufficient resources to focus on military and civil 
aspects. The overall number of troops is not sufficient facing the size of the country. UN 
peacekeepers have few experiences and are badly equipped to perform a stronger role in 
terms of civilian protection. The focus on military issues in MONUC is obvious. MONUC 
learned formally from its failures and addressed a wide variety of civilian factors like 
human rights, gender or sexual violence. The reaction was often not planned or came late. 
Even if there might be a will to proceed effectively, MONUC can not because of its own 
limits.  
It needs to be assigned that the mission is ignoring the UN principle of impartiality 
continuing fighting side by side with the FARDC. This might be reasonable if it is argued, 
that MONUC respects the principles of the UN charter while the FDLR or LRA does not. It 
is furthermore part of its mandate to support government troops. This shows one extreme 
of chapter VII operations. The use of force in Kimia II led to more human rights violations 
                                                     
9 Diehl, Druckman and Wall identified only 13% of training activities of peacekeepers involved contact skills 
and identified a gap between combat orientated training and contact orientated practice 
(Diehl/Druckman/Wall 1998:52). 
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than suitable. MONUC violated, what the ICISS states under the precautionary principle 
paragraph, that peacekeepers have to use proportional means and that they have to 
ensure maximum possible coordination with humanitarian organisations. It is classically 
Westphalian orientation with restoration of state authority before starting civilian measures. 
Although MONUC has a wide civilian mandate, it mainly used its military powers to restore 
statehood. However, especially JPTs ensure a benefit, where civilian approaches are 
combined with military ones. Facing the pressure from the Congolese government to 
withdraw, it is questionable whether the MONUC can have greater influence apart from 
now. MONUC was not best prepared to face all components from the beginning.  
 
5.2  UNMIL 
5.2.1 Lines of conflict 
Between 1997 and 2003 occurred heavy fighting in Liberia which led to internal displaced 
persons, destruction of most permanent buildings – at least in some regions – and 
destructed local economies (Temin 2004:711). Several human rights violations like 
summary executions and large-scale massacres, use of child soldiers and sex slaves, 
systematic rape and mutilation occurred (Human Rights Watch 2009a; McGovern 
2005:761). Combatant groups crossed the country in every direction and left destroyed 
infrastructure. 250.000 people died and over 800.00 people were displaced after fourteen 
years of fighting (Howard 2008:312). In 2003 gained two rebel groups (LURD and 
MODEL) control over two third of the country and the conflict was settled with a peace 
agreement (17.6.) basing on the departure of the former president Charles Taylor 
(American Society of International Law 2004:193). Finally, UNMIL followed in September 
2003 and was at that time the largest UN peacekeeping mission in the world (Hannum 
2006:72).  
 
Remaining sources of conflicts according to Temin are tribalism, intermarriage, land 
disputes, ex-combatant dissatisfaction, leadership concerns, retribution and retalisation, 
but also instability in Guinea (Temin 2004:712). According to the failed states index, 
Liberia is a state in danger becoming a failed state, ranging at rank 34 (Foreign Policy 
2009). There exist various ex-combatants that fought mainly for their own purpose or for 
Charles Taylor until 2003. The system of Taylor had led to soldier self-payment through 
attacks on civilians (International Crisis Group 2009b:4). It was based on exclusion, 
harassment of opponents and systematic human rights abuses as noted by various 
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scholars (American Society of International Law 2004:192). Furthermore, Liberia faced 
ever since its independence foreign involvement and training for militias (International 
Crisis Group 2009b:4). In contrast to the miscellaneous militias in Congo, the number of 
combatant troops in Liberia is relatively small and there was a wide societal agreement on 
necessary changes in the security sector. 
 
5.2.2 Formal provisions 
In Liberia were several previous UN missions. A UN Observer mission (UNOMIL) lasted 
between 1993 and 1997 with the objective to monitor and investigate human rights 
violations and was disbanded after the 1997 election of Charles Taylor as president 
(UNMIL 2010a). Until 1997, the mission had tried to bring peace to the country with the 
help of ECOWAS and finally ended with various peace agreements (American Society of 
International Law 2004:192). Later followed a UN peace-building support office in Liberia 
(UNOL), which was a DPA led mission during the Taylor years and which was conducted 
between 1997 and 2003 (Hannum 2006:72).  UNMIL followed after the end of the Taylor 
regime in 2003.   
 
UNMIL was authorised by UN SC resolution 1509 (2003) (UNMIL 2010a). The conflict was 
stated as an international threat in August 2003 by the SC after ECOWAS had decided to 
deploy troops and includes components of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
activities (American Society of International Law 2004:194). Shortly after the signature of 
the Comprehensive Peace Accords (Accra) on August 18th, UNMIL was authorised in 
September 2003. The mission consists mainly of troops from ECOWAS. 
 
The main objectives of UNMIL were observing and implementing the ceasefire agreement, 
to maintain liaison with field headquarters, to support elections, to provide security at 
cantonment sites, observe and monitor the disengagement, to support a Joint Monitoring 
Committee, to carry out DDRR and build security institutions and airports (UNMIL 2010a 
and b). UNMIL has further as objective to monitor and restructure police forces, facilitate 
the provision of humanitarian assistance on the basis of security, protect and promote 
human rights, particularly regarding vulnerable groups like IDPs, women, children and 
demobilised child-soldiers and to ensure human rights expertise within UNMIL (UNMIL 
2010a and b). UNMIL’s mandate includes an explicit reference to human rights protection, 
promotion and monitoring. In Liberia UNMIL has a robust mandate with chapter VII powers 
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(Woodhouse/Ramsbotham 2005:142). Additional, the SC called in resolution 1509 for a 
gender perspective for explicitly UNMIL – which includes a gender aspect in the mandate - 
and all other peacekeeping missions (Hudson 2005:799 a. 807). 
 
Liberia is a DPKO-lead mission with an independent expert on human rights and an 
OHCHR field presence (Hannum 2006:27).  It has an integrated mission management 
which should ensure comprehensive approaches (Coning 2010:14). UNMIL consists of 
around 15.000 military peacekeepers and around 1.100 police officers (UNMIL 2010a). 
 
5.2.3 Practical insights 
At the beginning of UNMIL several UN agencies like OHCHR, DPKO and UNDP 
cooperated (Hannum 2006:72). Salomons assigns that the preparations for the mission in 
Liberia were “demonstrations of inter-agency coordination and as models for an integrated, 
holistic response to the challenge of helping nation rebuild” (Salomons 2005:28). UNMIL 
had furthermore strong support from the US who were responsible for ensuring training of 
the military and which ensured - beneath the ECOWAS troops - security (UNMIL2010a). 
After the start of the mission, several points for civilian as well as military action have been 
identified. Due to the limitation of the Liberian army and an entirely new vetting of soldiers, 
it formed a unique reconstruction of the security sector. A private US military company 
(Dyncorp) was responsible for training military personnel and a limited number of 2.000 
soldiers was recruited according to the financing possibilities of the Liberian government 
(International Crisis Group 2009b:I). Dyncorp trained soldiers are described as being 
highly effective, but also as being too expensive to be kept by Liberia on its own 
(International Crisis Group 2009b:16). 
 
The international Crisis Group describes the Security Sector reforms in Liberia as 
unprecedented in the world – which is also accepted by the local population - , as self-
sustaining within the next five years and high lines the democratic elected government 
(International Crisis Group 2009b:1 a.9 a.12). This is particularly related “to hard work and 
in spite rather than because of the structures in place” (International Crisis Group 
2009b:9). The action of key decision makers has guaranteed the success of the process. 
The former Armed Forces of Liberia were dissolved after 2003 and the UN guaranteed 
security until a new force has been established from the ground (International Crisis Group 
2009b:1). Delays in recruitment and training and also the enlargement of demobilisation 
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were adapted and managed by professional militaries and thereby although finished later, 
the outcome was relatively successful (International Crisis Group 2009b:9ff a. 14). 
However, especially the DDRR process was subject for critic: Temin reports dissatisfaction 
of ex-combatants with the DDRR process, because disarmament was delayed and 
communication between former militias like LURD is random (Temin 2004:713). Other 
scholars like McGovern state, that fighters only buried weapons in the bush because 
reintegration benefits were not received (McGovern 2005:760). Problems occur also 
because ex-combatants perceive themselves as liberations from the Taylor regime also 
this is not shared by local communities due to the destruction of homes (Temin 2004:714). 
Ex-Combatants needs to be privileged with incentives at the beginning, while this has to 
be reduced in the long term, because they shall not been gratified for their former fighting 
(McGovern 2005:763). Leaderlessness of ex-combatants makes it difficult for UNMIL to 
address groups and drug abuse among ex-combatants is widespread while no drug 
rehabilitation programme is in place (Temin 2004:714). McGovern argues that a “arms-for-
cash operation” is insufficient in targeting DDRR processes because it pays child soldiers, 
gives a pull-factor for non-combatants to sell ammunition to DDRR and overall lacks 
incentives in form of jobs or education (McGovern 2005:761f.; International Crisis Group 
2009b:5). Some problems sound familiar when facing the DDRRR process in MONUC and 
it is a critical task in combining military with civil strategies.  
 
Police reform is also in the responsibility of UNMIL but has been called as failure by the 
human rights and protection unit within UNMIL in 2005, while UNMIL officials defended the 
police vetting process (International Crisis Group 2010:17). However, the police have 
already an officer’s corps and an all female unit has been trained (International Crisis 
Group 2009b:18). The integration of women into police units has been faced by UNMIL 
and is widely accepted in society but further training needs to take place (International 
Crisis Group 2009b:8). 
Because the police lacked basic equipment and deficiencies in police management, the 
population felt less secure than before the deployment of UNMIL (International Crisis 
Group 2009b:19). Responsibility problems facing other security agencies and a 
dysfunctional justice sector are further main challenges that need to be addressed 
(International Crisis Group 2009b:20). McGovern criticises that Liberia lacks a long-term 
engagement  for 15-25 years for providing security and argues that further revenue-
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collection trusteeship and transparent state revenues are needed to face widespread 
corruption (McGovern 2005:760f. a.765). 
 
Women are relatively well presented not only in the police but also in the political system, 
most prominent is the Liberian president Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. This is particularly 
interesting facing the history of violence against women. Some scholars argue, that rape 
has been systematically used in conflict in Liberia, although few have been documented 
(Skjelsbæk 2001:72). The government includes gender in all of its policies including 
security sector reform and female recruiting has been emphasised by women in leading 
positions (International Crisis Group 2009b:12). Women can have a positive impact on 
peacekeeping as they are expected to have another approach because of their socially 
constructed role which taught them to be more peaceful than the violent masculine soldier 
(DeGroot 2001:34f.). UNMIL’s gender office was relatively effective in prioritising this topic 
and ensured a successful transition. However, Carey and Simic report, that there exist 
peacekeepers in Liberia that are guilty of sexual violence and sex has been used in IDP 
camps  as “transactional sex” to meet basic needs10 (Simic 2009:290; Carey 2001:62). 
This is not only a problem in Liberia like the case of MONUC has shown. 
 
The conflict in Liberia swallowed in 2003 and 2004 with uprisings that have been 
controlled by UNMIL (International Crisis Group 2009b:5). Other security challenges are 
the re-establishment of former fighting groups as insurgents, land disputes with returnees, 
high criminality rates, cases of self-justice and drug cultures (International Crisis Group 
2009b:6f.). Soldiers are badly paid in Liberia and the only incentive for joining the army is a 
commitment to the own country, because driver for UNMIL receive more than double as 
much as soldiers (International Crisis Group 2009b:14). The number of peacekeepers 
facing three million Liberians and a country with the size of Iceland appears much in 
relation to other peacekeeping missions. It is relatively low when compared to standing 
armies of peaceful countries like Denmark or Germany. It has been argued by scholars, 
that UNMIL was able to conduct its military strategy because of individuals in key 
coordination roles and because the US took extra responsibility (International Crisis Group 
2009b:15). 
 
                                                     
10 sexual violence is defined as involuntary sexual contact, rape includes a violent aspect (Skelsbæk 
2001:71) 
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McGovern urges improvements in community development, refugee repatriation and 
redeployment of civil administration which is hindered by delays in security reform 
(McGovern 2005:761). Those topics are civilian measures that are additional to the military 
process and should be part of peacekeeping processes. Disputes over land are inevitable 
and need to be settled on a local base (Temin 2004:713). Land disputes are a frequent 
topic in peacebuilding processes and need special attention with appropriate strategies 
that still need to be identified. 
 
Overall, UNMIL combines political, security, development, rule of law and human rights 
dimensions and shows insights for the already attested development from military towards 
civilian-led peacekeeping missions which is also indicated by one quarter civilians being 
part of the overall peacekeeping personnel (Coning 2010:13). ‘Unexpected consequences’ 
like delay in DDRR or drug programmes as well as economic opportunities can be 
regarded as lessons that need to be learned but which also actually need adoptions. 
UNMIL learned particular facing the recruitment of armed forces, where applicants names 
are published in newspapers for identifying those guilty of war crimes and human rights 
violations (McGovern 2005:762). UNMIL is a mission that has been established at a later 
point of conflict, when the Lusaka accords were already signed and there existed a willing 
for peace guarantees. The main conflict can be regarded as settled. Coning and other 
authors argue, that UNMIL is successful in performing the tasks assigned to it (Coning 
2010:11). This is also due to the preparations before the mission, the wide support for it 
and the preceding missions that built experience among ECOWAS and UN. The mission 
faced the right topics. UNMIL is relatively liberally mandated and is relatively large, 
however, it is already down drawn since 2008 (International Crisis Group 2009b:I). 
McGovern indicates that peacekeepers are still effective in preventing violence, but that 
there is no “lead-nation” that could step in, in the case UNMIL leaves Liberia (McGovern 
2005:762). Also the International Crisis Group urged for a remaining presence to face 
possible insurgencies (International Crisis Group 2009b:II).  
 
5.3 UNMIK 
5.3.1 Lines of conflict in Kosovo 
The conflict in Kosovo has to be seen in a wider context of conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia. This 
is mainly related to ethnic conflicts between Serbs and Muslims mainly in Bosnia-
Herzegowina and Croatia including ethnic cleansing and other grave human rights 
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violations (Sitkowski 2006:128f.). These ethnic conflicts originated in history of Serbians 
and Albanians – which are the largest ethnic groups in Kosovo - and conflict is used for 
justifying injustices against the other side (Murphy 2007:69). Until 1999, Serbs suppressed 
the Albanian majority in Kosovo. The conflict in Kosovo was shaped by the resistance 
movement of the Kosovo Liberation Army that started with guerrilla attacks on Serbs in 
1996 (Murphy 2007:71). In 1998 the KLA clashed with the Serbian authorities causing 
2.000 causalities and 400.000 displaced persons (Murphy 2007:72). Suppression 
escalated towards open violence. After the death of around 40 civilians in 1999, the 
contact group - comprising Russia, the US, UK, Italy, France and Germany - argued for a 
withdrawal of Serb forces and the deployment of international forces which led to the 
Rambouillet negotiations in February (Murphy 2007:73). The reached agreement with an 
international acceptance of the KLA failed and a NATO-led intervention followed and 
ending the suppression of the Albanian majority in Kosovo (Murphy 2007:74).  
 
NATO air-strikes started in March 1999 and ended in June 1999 with the signature of the 
Kosovo Peace Accords (Murphy 2007:75). The air-strikes have been criticised as being 
illegal under current international law, while it coincided with the ICIS justification for 
military intervention as large scale ethnic cleansing. UNMIK was deployed soon afterwards 
and KFOR troops under NATO authority were responsible for securing Kosovo.  However, 
at the end of August 1999, around 240.000 people were still displaced (Amnesty 
International 2004:7). Since then the conflict swallows on a lower level. In March 2004 
anti-Serb violence with around 50.000 people involved took place proving that the conflict 
has not yet been solved (Tansey 2009:158 a. 162; Magalachvili 2005:118). February 2008 
marked a decisive point in the history of Kosovo, when it unilaterally declared 
independence from Serbia with the support of some EU members (Tansey 2009). 
 
The preceding mission before UNMIK was UNPROFOR with the objective to ensure 
demilitarisation, the protection from prosecution or discrimination of the population and the 
return of displaced persons not only in Kosovo but in hole ex-Yugoslavia (Sitkowski 
2006:130). The mission mainly failed, because of the ethnic cleansing by Serbs including 
massacres around towns like Srebrenica (Bosnia and Herzegowina), where the UN was 
unable to react and to protect the life of civilians (Sitkowski 2006:140).  
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Kosovo is not categorised by the Failed States Index, but Tansey argues that Kosovo can 
not yet be described as a sovereign state or as a secure democracy (Tansey 2009:153). 
Serbia still claims Kosovo as part of its territory although the majority population – 
Albanians - resist (Tansey 2009:154).  
 
5.3.2 Formal provisions 
UNMIK was established in 1999 open ended, works closely with the NATO-led KFOR and 
is responsible for the administrative functions and services in Kosovo (Murphy 
2007:XII;Wet 2009:83). The mission had full executive and legislative authority and is 
headed by the Special Representative to the UN Secretary General (Tansey 2009:155). 
He is authorised to delegate different tasks to other international organisations although 
the control function of the SC remains controversial and it is not clear whether every 
delegation needs to be affirmed by the Council (Wet 2009:88f.). UNMIK is authorised by 
resolution 1244 under chapter VII and has a robust mandate (Murphy 2007:9ff. a. 78). It is 
furthermore DPKO-lead (Howard 2008:301). The mission is sometimes described as a 
subcontracted mission to multinationals, because it includes different pillars with different 
foci (Sitkowski 2006:33). While KFOR is responsible for military question and the 
protection of civilians, UNMIK is responsible for all administrative matters.  
 
Overall, the mission consists of four pillars, namely humanitarian assistance for refugees 
led by the UNHCR, civil administration including juridical and correctional services as well 
as police services led by UNMIK, democratisation and institution building led by the OSCE 
(OMiK) and reconstruction and economic development led by the EU (Murphy 2007:79; 
Wet 2009:84). After claiming independence, the EU launched a new rule of law mission 
(EULEX) which originally should have replaced the UN mission. Especially Russia lobbied 
for an operation of EULEX under UN authority - as has been accepted by UN SC 
statement S/PRST/2008/44 (Tansey 2009:159f.; Wet 2009:83; UN SC 2010:1).  UNMIK 
reduced its international personnel over time referring competencies to local institutions 
since 2001 (Wet 2009:84).  The mandate developed from full executive services towards 
monitoring and supporting local institutions with the independence of Kosovo (UNMIK 
2008:1). 
 
UNMIK has the tasks to promote the establishment of authority and self-governance, 
perform civilian administrative functions, organise and oversee institutions including 
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elections, transfer responsibilities to the local level, facilitate the political process, support 
infrastructure, economic reconstruction, humanitarian and disaster relief, maintain civil law 
and order, protect human rights and ensure safe return of all refugees (UNMIK 2008:2; 
Amnesty International 2004:8; UN SC 2010a:1). This includes also recruitment and 
training of prosecutors in the justice system and the overall reform of the justice sector 
(Wet 2009:91). 
 
The mission model for UNMIK is one of direct UN exercise of classical state power 
performing administrative task like justice administration (Stahn 2005:143). Some scholars 
see the missions in Kosovo and East Timor as a new generation of peacekeeping  where 
the UN take the responsibility for executive tasks until the country can govern itself 
(Landshuter 2007:59f.). 
 
5.3.3 Practical insights 
Since its deployment UNMIK has created institutions of governance, overseen elections 
and enabled political development (Tansey 2009: 156). It faced several difficult tasks of an 
emerging state and built structures on a purely civilian basis.  
 
Most scholars criticise UNMIK. Magalachvili criticises that there was no comprehensive 
plan for a peaceful future of Kosovo, that the short-term cost-reducing orientation is 
dominant in the mission and that most of the approaches ignored the reintegration of 
Serbs (Magalachvili 2005:121 a.136). Similar, Stahn criticises that the UN overtook 
administrative tasks in the justice sector in an “ad hoc fashion” where the UN 
experimented without having an adequate number of lawyers with sufficient knowledge 
(cursive in original, Stahn 2005:154).  
As the last report of UNMIK and the one of the Secretary General showed, fighting 
regularly reoccurs and incidents are frequent although attacks are mostly directed against 
buildings (UNMIK 2010:2; UN SC 2010a:3 a. 5ff.). Most cases are related to ethnic 
motivated violence and acts of revenge for those acts. Ethnic tensions are also present in 
the juridical system, where intimidations occur, or judges are unwilling to judge over cases 
with other ethnic involvement (Zoglin 2005:69).  Even the UN Secretary General needs to 
assign that the overall situation in especially northern Kosovo remains fragile because of 
societal violence (UN SC 201a:10; UNHCR 2010:12).  
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AI criticises the violence caused by incapacity of UNMIK and KFOR to address human 
rights violations including impunity for perpetrators of inter-ethnic violence. They highlight 
the “failure to adequately investigate and bring prosecutions to many ethnically motivated 
murders and other violent attacks which have occurred since 1999” (Amnesty International 
2004:5 a. 28).  AI notes that this improved slowly over time.  UNMIK is furthermore unable 
to guarantee freedom of movement and access to social and economic minority rights as 
stated by AI and UNHCR, although UNMIK denies this incapability  (UNHCR 2010:14; 
Amnesty International 2004:5). 
 
Kosovo is still a divided society with segregation among Serbs and Albanians and with 
parallel political structures (International Crisis Group 2009a:3). Especially in Northern 
Kosovo parallel structures that cover not only local administration and elected bodies, but 
also Serbian financed courts, health-care and educational facilities do exist (Tansey 
2009:162). However, insights show that the mere existence was not a problem, but that 
the unequal distribution of power between the structures caused problems (Magalachvili 
2005:132). There were occasional meetings with the other’s community and structures 
(UN SC 2010a:8).  
 
UNMIK established a Human Rights Advisory Panel in 2010. Around 450 cases of 
complaints of human rights have been noticed, the construction of this panel had a delay 
of four years (UNMIK 2010a:9). The delays show that topics like human are controversial 
and consent is difficult to achieve.  
 
UNMIK claims that it successfully investigated various criminal cases, constructed police 
stations and border control points, and trained and deployed police officers (UNMIK 
2008:2). CivPol missions include the monitoring and reporting of performances of local 
police officers, mentoring and training, reform and restructuring, investigation of abuses by 
local police and transitional administration (Shin 2005:170). Most police operations were 
performed by local police, operated generally under international guidelines and minorities 
were part of the personnel (UNHCR 2010:4f.). According to the Secretary General the 
current strength of the police component of UNMIK lies at 8 (sic), while the strength of the 
military liaison component has strength of 9 (UNMIK 2010a:16f.). This shows reduced 
capabilities of UNMIK and is rather critical facing the remaining challenges.  
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UNMIK established an office on missing persons and forensics in 2002, that investigated 
suspected graves, performs autopsies and keeps up-to-date records of missing persons , 
but relied heavily on donor funding instead of official government contributions (UNMIK 
2008:4f.). The positive interpretation of UNMIK has been challenged by reports of other 
organisations focusing on delay and inadequate equipment. The justice system shows 
coordination problems between local and international prosecutors and in witness 
protection (Wet 2009:92). The problem of little or no training for new international judges 
and high fluidity of lawyers occurred, but overall the quality of indictments improved 
through international prosecutors (Zoglin 2005:68f.;Shin 2005:172). Regarding rule of law, 
UNMIK had main problems like the unfamiliarity of many police officers with criminal 
investigation under Kosovo law and unavailability of English translations of that law (Stahn 
2005:155). UNMIK mainly acts as facilitator and helps to ensure identity cards and forensic 
services in close cooperation with the Red Cross11 (UN SC 2010a:6).  
There are cases where the UN violated human rights like in the case of detention without 
juridical verification of detention (Stahn 2005:156). As in Liberia, peacekeepers exist that 
are guilty of sexual violence but who also have immunity in their home countries (Carey 
2001:62). This diminished the role of UNMIK as trusted partner.  
 
UNMIK also established a unit to advise on gender-related issues like violence against 
women, political representation or economic recovery and it conducted in cooperation with 
UNIFEM und UNDP training programs for local staff and encouraged women to stand for 
office (Hudson 2005:802). UNMIK succeeded in establishing quotas for the Kosovo 
Assembly with a number of seats reserved for women (28%, Hudson 2005:803) 
 
UNMIK reports that it enabled the return of overall more than 17.000 IDPs since 2000. As 
part of its mandate, UNMIK already transferred several authorities like in the case of 
voluntary returns of IDPs to local governmental institutions (UNMIK 2008:6). IDPs that did 
not want to return to their homes because UNMIK failed to protect them adequately, in the 
beginning were not helped by UNMIK neither by UNHCR. This changed over time and 
UNMIK learned that they had to help IDPs to settle in safe areas and not to force them to 
return to unwanted areas (Amnesty International 2004:21f.). This learning of UNMIK is a 
positive example for action undertaken by UNMIK. However, there is still an overall 
number of nearly 20.000 IDPs in Kosovo (UNHCR 2010:16). Although UNMIK encourages 
                                                     
11 the UN Secretary General reports 37 field operations and 17 exhumations between September to 
November 2009. 
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displaced persons to return by “go-and-see visits”, the number of returnees remained 
relatively low and a number of IDPs is still in need for protection (UN SC 2010a:7)  
 
Scholars assign that the institutions built in Kosovo are weak and rule of law is not 
implemented because authorities are not willing or not able to do so (Tansey 2009:164). 
Furthermore, UNMIK built the Kosovo Property Agency in 2006 to facilitate land disputes. 
Critics argue that the Agency has been unable to act as decided because enforcement of 
decisions is feared to lead to violence (UNMIK 2008:7f.;International Crisis Group 
2009a:9). The Serbian government boycotted the agency when it became government 
controlled. This example of boycott by Serbs poses major problems for targeting the whole 
population of Kosovo. One former UN officer stated that there were not more incentives 
provided by UNMIK than by Belgrade, thereby undermining the output-legitimacy of the 
mission (Magalachvili 2005:129). One factor that had not been addressed by UNMIK was 
the creation of jobs or of economic freedom (Magalachvili 2005:131). 
 
The latest reports show that corruption in ministries, juridical and governmental agencies is 
not solved (UNMIK 2010:1; UNHCR 2010:5f.).  UNMIK further reports based on an OSCE 
source, that institutions like the government tend to influence media content through 
directed advertising thereby reducing the freedom of press (UNMIK 2010:4; UNHCR 
2010:9). Transparency International rates Kosovo at the bottom of its Corruption list and it 
is one of the most by bribery affected countries (Tansey 2009:162). AI also criticises the 
lack of transparency of UNMIK where no details of investigation have been published 
when the Kosovo Police was involved (Amnesty International 2004:14). This would have 
been important to ensure trust in investigations. 
 
Not only direct problems occur, but also structural weaknesses within UNMIK and between 
UNMIK and other agencies. Magalachvilli criticises the bureaucracy of UNMIK that lead to 
missing efforts for projects in the field (Magalachvili 2005:123f.). UNMIK did not show the 
personal intensive involvement of important field coordinators like in UNMIL and other 
missions. Howland showed for Angola, that the Human Rights Division within MONUA 
worked with flexibility to the needs on the ground. A narrow mandate brought success in 
some efforts and in being social change agents for human rights themes (Howland 
2004:6ff.). Already the Brahimi Report stated that peacekeeping missions have to show a 
greater flexibility for the interpretation of the mandate and the use of financing (UN 
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2000:4). Magalachvili suggests for UNMIK that the UN personnel bureau had significant 
influence mainly restricting officers in flexibility (Magalachvili 2005:138).  
UNMIK showed lacing inter-agency cooperation.  Especially during the 2004 violence, AI 
identified the lack of communication between KFOR and CIVPOL (Amnesty International 
2004:7). The UN Secretary General recently stated, that communication between UNMIK 
and Kosovo authorities has improved but remained difficult on areas as justice, customs 
and cultural heritage (UN SC 2010a:1). Furthermore the coordination between EULEX and 
UNMIK was interpreted in a competitive manner and duties and powers are disputed, 
thereby reducing cooperation possibilities, (Wet 2009:85f. a.94; Tansey 2009:163). 
Although overall fighting has been mainly freezed and standards have been achieved, 
there has been a lack of first-level or second level learning during the mission (Howard 
2008:303 a. 310). 
 
Inter-agency communication problems have also attested for other UN peacekeeping 
missions and it appears as a general problem of peacekeeping missions (Hazen 
2007:327).  
 
Other institutions than UNMIK are responsible for tasks that have been performed by the 
UN in other missions as MONUC, for example human rights, media and elections.  
The conflict in Kosovo is an example for regional actors taking the responsibility (NATO 
and EU) and being something like a “region-cop” (Hirsh 2000:7 a.3). However, this caused 
problems when KFOR interpreted its mandate that it was not obliged to stop violence 
against minority settlements. International organisations appear as less aware of human 
rights in their approaches than the UN is.  
 
In 2007, the UN Secretary General stated, that UNMIK achieved what it could achieve and 
UNMIK’s presence seemed already being terminated if there would not have been 
international veto (Tansey 2009:165). The report of the Secretary General suggests that 
role of UNMIK is reduced to be a mediator and communication broker between agencies 
(UN SC 2010a:2f.).   
 
The mission in Kosovo was mainly established after the conflict was not settled. Ethnic 
conflict lines are not solved and a “dull domestic consensus has been set aside” following 
a “standards before status” policy until 2005 (Tansey 2009:157f.; Breau 2007:459). It must 
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be assigned that the solution of ethnic conflicts takes a lot of time. The mission itself is of 
rather limited scope with UNMIK focus on administrative reconstruction and it is therefore 
more peace enforcement through capacity building. This was only partly successful, 
because the UN did not succeed in integrating Serbians into administrative structures. This 
was also due to the Serbian government’s support and financing for parallel structures. 
Another argument brought by mediation analysts is that mediation can have a short-term 
impact on peacebuilding but inhibits long-term peace because of time consistency 
problems of the former agreements (Beardsley 2008:737). Scholars further argue that 
remediation could solve this problem. UNMIK faces the problem that the peace accord 
with Serbia has been accepted but did not prohibit Serbia from not accepting Kosovo and 
from building parallel structures. It may be assumed that regular remediation may have 
solved the problem. The overall number of troops is relatively low and the mission was 
reduced to holding the responsibility without bringing a durable solution to the parties.  
Facing the relatively small size of Kosovo, the mission did not succeed in addressing the 
roots of the conflicts. Building only administrative structures has proven to be insufficient in 
addressing ethnic tensions. The deployment of EULEX and the Russian opposition against 
stronger Kosovo enforcement changed the UN’s role towards a more passive, coordinating 
and overseeing one. The importance for civil factors has diminished over time and has 
become nearly irrelevant. 
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6. Conclusion 
The cases analysed are all third generation peacekeeping missions and not addressing 
conflicts between states. The main addressees are the populations in the country while the 
enemies are mainly local militias like in the case of MONUC. All three analysed missions 
are DPKO led missions. A comparison with DPA-led missions would be interesting for 
further research to show whether problems between DPA and DPKO occur (like indicated 
by Hannum for the international level, Hannum 2006:28 a.7412). Beneath those similarities 
several differences do exist: As all missions address different lines of conflicts and every 
conflict has different bases, peacekeeping missions are different in their approach.   
For comparison MONUC focuses on a stronger military concept with direct support for 
fighting the FDLR and sets civil approaches aside. The MONUC can be most described as 
chapter VII peace enforcement mission and an UN mission that is unsuccessful basing on 
deterrence, because the conflict is too severe to be solved by deterrence. In sharp 
contrast is the mission in Kosovo, which “only” is mandated with building administrative 
structures and local capacity. The actual security provision is supplied by KFOR. The UN 
“delegates” at some time difficult objectives to regional organisations like NATO, but also 
to ECOWAS like in the case of UNMIL. Especially the mission in Kosovo is conducted with 
the support of other organisations like the OSCE. Likewise, donors trained police forces in 
Liberia and US-financed Dyncorp trained the military. This was not less expensive but 
easier and faster available than standing Liberian forces. Further developments might go 
into the direction of project related sub delegation under the supervision of the UN. This 
might lead to financing by the international community for projects in the interest of the UN, 
under the supervision and the protection of the UN. However, it is questionable if 
international lobby groups would be willing or prepared to operate large scale projects. 
Today’s missions – if not conducted by the UN - are conducted by authorised 
organisations with an interest in the work and are mostly not financed by UN 
peacekeeping budget. 
 
In my opinion, it depends largely on the implementation of a mission whether it becomes a 
success or not. Especially the position and engagement of senior human rights advisers 
could help to implement peace ensuring measures on a civil level. According to theory a 
combination of changing perceptions on security and mutual trust is expected to be 
successful. This is at least true for MONUC where neither trust nor security is achieved. It 
                                                     
12 Hannum also provides some simple case studies on the relation between DPA, OHCHR and DPKO 
Hannum 2006:63ff. 
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is partly true for UNMIK, where security has improved but is dependent on KFOR and 
where trust across ethnicities has not been achieved on a basis that would resolve the 
conflict. At best, UNMIL faced security and trust issues, while trust issues are better 
implemented like gender components or reintegration of combatants. UNMIL is the only 
example that includes a gender issue in the mission mandate. Integrated approaches 
might enhance learning during an UN mission, but further research on this topic is 
necessary. Security is fragile if no civilian solution is found.  
 
The UN applies several models of peacekeeping at the same time; with UNMIK as a 
principally civilian mission where other organisations do the dirty work, MONUC par 
contrast is principally military with some civilian components, and UNMIL bases on a 
regional solution with ECOWAS under UN flag and is mixed between civilian and military 
approaches. It can be argued, that the UN itself is not sure on the ideal way of mixture 
between civilian and military approaches, while effectively UNMIL poses the best example 
of the cases analysed. Although deployed in different contexts, especially the older 
mission of UNMIK has fewer capacities and is less complex than the other missions. 
 
Insights from other missions also show, that is more a question of local action and 
coordination in the field, if the mission becomes a success like the missions in Guinea-
Bissau or Guatemala (Hannum 2006:67f.). Studies show mixed results for several cases 
like for Angola, where some scholars state minimal improvements (Hannum 2007:77f.), 
while others state a wide success because of intense autonomy for the mission.  
 
Economic issues are important for measures like demobilisation and disarmament as 
incentives for joining armed militias need to be cut down. This leads to the question, why 
no economic small scale civil approaches are integrated in UN peacekeeping missions. 
One might argue, that other institutions like the World Bank or the IMF are providing 
assistance in economic and financial questions, but there where no insights that those 
where integrated into peacekeeping missions. This becomes especially crucial in cases 
like the DRC where resources are one trigger of war, but also in cases like Liberia, where 
police jobs are badly paid and doing something for the own country remains the own 
motivation for joining. 
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Unexpected consequences are another problem that needs to be faced. In Liberia ex-
combatants became addicted because drugs were used as some form of power enhancer 
during the war. A drug rehabilitation program would be an adequate measure to address 
this problem. Actually, this is not a problem in the DRC or Kosovo.  Also expected conflicts 
like the ethnic tensions in Kosovo have not been solved, but some improvements have 
been achieved. Especially for Kosovo, international influence through Serbia in form of 
parallel structures in administration, but also through differences between Russia and the 
EU on the topic, led to problems during the mission and hindered addressing the 
underlying roots of conflict. A stronger focus on renegotiation of a topic and on discursive 
change of perceptions would promise more success.  
 
Some tensions between civil and military approaches exist. While military approaches 
focus on a quick success against an enemy, civil approaches are long term oriented. 
However, the political will for a peacekeeping mission is normally only high during the first 
years until the most urgent threats have diminished. This does not mean that the freedom 
is lasting and that peacekeepers can return without risking new conflicts. Furthermore, the 
cases analysed showed special success when most of the civil and military elements 
where concentrated at the beginning and conducted with a high level of resources like in 
the case of UNMIL. However, the overall success of a mission becomes more critical when 
international support is reduced and the country is again on its own.  
This principal problem of long term orientation of peacekeeping missions, but short term 
engagement of international actors, is not expected to change. The SC authorises 
missions that are most urgent, when consent of perceptions on threats for the international 
system exist. Over time, other conflicts become more prominent and gain special attention. 
Peacekeeping will therefore ever be insufficient if it relies on state centred structures.  
 
I argue for a more detailed conceptualisation of contemporary peacekeeping missions. 
Although traditional peacekeeping remains the most common point of referal, it is no 
longer the most spread type of mission. Research shows that peacekeepers are most 
successful when they are able at performing military and civilian tasks simultaneously 
which also causes training problems (Diehl/Druckman/Wall 1998:51). Facing such different 
tasks like humanitarian assistance, establishing national authority or promoting good 
governance et al. (Hazen 2007:327) it is difficult to combine all factors. It is catchy to train 
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soldiers in different civilian tasks or to train civilian personnel in military tasks, but it might 
be possible with enough resources. 
 
Studies identified three main factors for failure; namely the difficulty with consent of the 
parties, dysfunction of the UN Secretariat and lack of organisational learning, and 
contradicting mandates by the SC (Howard 2008:50). Especially consent of the parties has 
been found as difficult in at least MONUC and UNMIK. The other factors were not a main 
focus of this analysis because the focus was on national and subnational factors. A more 
detailed analysis of the international decisions sourrounding the three cases would give a 
more complete picture.  Another point of critique is the lacking analysis of success factors 
not only among scholars but also within UN. White already criticised that there “is no real 
conceptual or legal impediment to the successful development of more robust 
peacekeeping, empowered to protect civilians” (White 2009:354). 
 
It needs to be assigned, that most of the sources have been rather critical towards 
peacekeeping missions and only few identified best-practices. 
 
It becomes necessary to use complex missions with best equipped and well trained troops 
and civilians, that are capable of conducting not only military tasks and protection of 
civilians, but also to start building human rights work and rule of law for successful long 
term stability. This is also related to ad hoc financing which could be avoided with a 
peacekeeping fund with a stable budget (compare UN 2000:5). Furthermore it seems as if 
the UN at least partially still focuses on peacekeeping as principle tool for overseeing first 
cease-fires and then in preventing human rights abuses (as argued by White 2009:343). It 
has to be accepted that clear phases are not in every case appropriate and that several 
conflicts necessary the simultaneous deployment of civil and military actors. The values of 
trust and security are interrelated.  
 
It is not only UN engagement that is conducted in the field, but also other efforts like NATO 
or EU engagement in the case of Kosovo, US engagement in Liberia, or the Red Cross in 
MONUC and also in the other cases. Those efforts are not ever coupled. It worked better 
in UNMIL than in UNMIK, while MONUC had other lines of conflict and is not that 
dependent on international actors. 
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Civilian approaches matter depending on the focus of each mission. Most conflicts have 
components that need to be handled on a civilian basis, e.g. MONUC has relatively few 
possibilities for civil work. Other missions like UNMIL or UNMIK have stronger civil 
components because military engagement is limited due to the post-conflict phase. If more 
civil components in the case of MONUC would guarantee success is not sure, given the 
widespread violence, different lines of conflict and instability of the whole country. Civilian 
approaches are currently not important for MONUC, but they could ameliorate the overall 
outcome and build trust among communities. Civilian approaches in UN peacekeeping are 
more prominent in UNMIL and UNMIK with different orientations. The relative success in 
Liberia is mainly due to factors that happened per hazard but also due to the addressing of 
gender which calmed the situation. There is simply no blueprint for peacekeeping missions 
and there is often no time for preparation due to the ad-hoc character of most missions. 
However, UNMIL seemed more prepared than the other missions and it becomes 
therefore crucial to be prepared to address the right roots of conflict and not to focus on 
everything but nothing.  
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8. Annex 
 
Illustration 1: Change of Identities 
 
Source: Own table, following Wendt 1992:422. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 2: Trinity of Peacekeeping 
 
Bures 2008:26 
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failure of identity 
Change of identity 
Positive response by others Negative response by 
others 
Internalisation refusal 
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Illustration 3: Structure of approach. 
 
Source: Own illustration 
 
Ill.4 Functions of Peacekeeping 
 
Bures 2007:417 
 
UN peacekeeping 
Civil 
Determinants of 
success 
Socialisation 
o Changing perceptions 
in society 
o Humanitarian 
assistance 
 
o „climate of peace“ 
o „trust“ 
 
o „acceptance“ of 
structures, new values 
apart from security 
Functions 
Military 
Positive response by citizens 
o Removing the 
(perception) of threat 
 
 
o Building „security“ (as 
highest desired norm 
before conflict end) 
 
 
o End of large-scale 
violence  
Human Security 
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Illustration 5: Distinction between Westphalian and post-westphalian orientation. 
 
Bures 2008:24 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 6: Phases of UN Peacekeeping 
1 The nascent period (1946-1956) 
2 The assertive period (1956-1967) 
3 The dormant period (1967-1973) 
4 The resurgent period (1973-1978) 
5 The maintenance period (1978-1988) 
6 The expansion period (1988-1993) 
7 The contraction period (1993-1999) 
8 The revitalization period (1999-?) 
Bures 2008:35 
 
 
Illustration 7: Conflict stages and resolution 
 
Bures 2008:56 
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Illustration 8: Characteristics of Missions 
 
Diehl/Druckman/Wall 1998:41 
